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Abstract
We propose a simple common framework for Risk-Limiting and Bayesian (polling) audits for two-candidate
plurality elections. Using it, we derive an expression for the general Bayesian audit; in particular, we do not restrict
the prior to a beta distribution. We observe that the decision rule for the Bayesian audit is a simple comparison test,
which enables the use of pre-computation—without simulations—and greatly increases the computational efficiency
of the audit. Our main contribution is a general form for an audit that is both Bayesian and risk-limiting: the Bayesian
Risk-Limiting Audit, which enables the use of a Bayesian approach to explore more efficient Risk-Limiting Audits.
1 Introduction
The framework of risk-limiting audits (RLAs), as described by Lindeman and Stark [1], formalizes a rigorous approach
to election verification. The purpose of an audit is to require a full hand count if the outcome is wrong; the risk is the
rate at which it fails to do so. A RLA is one that guarantees that the risk will be smaller than a pre-specified bound.
Computing the risk is tricky, however. If the audit rule and parameters are fixed, the risk depends on the (unknown)
true tally of the election. Smaller margins in favor of the declared loser make it harder to detect that the outcome is
wrong, and correspond to larger values of the risk. An audit typically uses a single measure to represent the varied
values the risk can take as the underlying (unknown) tally varies.
• A RLA uses as its measure the largest possible risk, corresponding to the wrong outcome which is hardest to
detect: either a tie or a margin of one vote in favor of the(a) declared loser.
• The Bayesian audit, as described by Rivest and Shen [6], is a newer approach to election audits. It considers
each possible margin in favor of the declared loser(s). The Bayesian measure, termed the upset probability, is a
weighted average of the corresponding risks.
Each type of audit samples ballots, stopping when the risk measure is smaller than a guaranteed upper bound.
Depending on what the true tally is, there could be considerable difference between the measure, which is computed
from the sampled ballots, and the true risk, which is unknown. While all we can compute is the measure, it is the true
risk we care about.
• The true risk is never larger than the RLA measure (maximum risk). The RLA stops when the maximum risk is
smaller than the bound; the true risk will also be smaller than the bound.
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• The true risk of a close election could be larger than the Bayesian measure, the upset probability, which is an
average risk. The Bayesian audit stops when the upset probability is smaller than the bound, but the true risk
might still be too large. There is no way for the observer to know whether this is the case, because the true tally
is unknown.
In addition to proposing the Bayesian approach, Rivest and Shen also propose the use of Po´lya urn simulations to
compute whether an audit should end or not. While the simulations are not efficient enough for real time use, they
provide the only way we know to carry out the audit of a complex election. Traditional RLAs are more efficient for
plurality elections and can be reduced to a comparison test as described in the classical work of Wald [7]. The CLIP
audit of Rivest [4] is another RLA which may also be reduced to such a comparison, though the values are computed
using simulations1.
The Bayesian framework is exceptionally promising as a means of designing efficient audits (requiring a small sample
size). As we have seen above, important open research areas include (a) the characterization of the risk limit (or
maximum risk) of a Bayesian audit and (b) improving its computational efficiency.
The following are important open questions regarding characterization of Bayesian audits: Is there a well-defined
relationship between RLAs and Bayesian audits? What is the relationship between the largest risk (RLA risk measure)
and the upset probability (Bayesian audit risk measure)? What is the closest election for which the upset probability is
not smaller than the risk? That is, what is the closest election for which the upset probability is a reasonable stand-in
for the true risk? Can Bayesian audits be designed to be comparable to traditional RLAs in computational efficiency?
Also of interest are questions regarding audits that are both Bayesian and risk-limiting: What form might Bayesian
risk-limiting audits (RLAs)—where the upset probability is identical to the largest risk—take? Could Bayesian RLAs
be designed to use a smaller sample than traditional RLAs?
While we do not attempt to answer all the questions posed above, we present early results that should provide a
basis for exploring the answers. In this paper, while restricting ourselves to a two-candidate election and polling
audits, we view both audits in a single framework. Among Bayesian audits, we study only those with equal prior
winning probabilities for each candidate. We expect that our results will be applicable in a straightforward fashion to
comparison audits for two-candidate plurality elections as well, though that is work in progress.
1.1 Our contributions
Our contributions are as follow:
1. We show that the Bayesian audit can be reduced to a simple comparison test between the number of votes for
the winner in the audit sample and two pre-computed values for this sample size:
• a minimum number of votes for the winner, k+, above which the election outcome is declared correct, and
• a maximum number of votes for the winner, k−, below which the audit proceeds to a hand count.
The values of k+ and k− can be pre-computed, making the Bayesian audit a feasible real-time audit, as it is a
simple look-up process at the time of drawing samples. If Bayesian audits for more complex elections—such
as those with multiple candidates (we are still working on this)—could also be reduced to comparison tests,
computational efficiency could be greatly improved.
1Philip Stark has mentioned work in progress: a CLIP-like audit which does not use simulations.
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2. We show that the traditional RLA as described in [1] is a Bayesian audit with a prior that assumes that, if the
election were correct, the announced winner would earn a fraction p of the votes; if not, she would win half the
votes. Such an incorrect outcome is the hardest possible to distinguish from a correct one, which is what makes
the audit a RLA.
3. Motivated by our understanding of the traditional RLA, and restricting ourselves to odd N , we define a class
of Bayesian audits that are also RLAs. An audit in this class may have any prior on tally values for a correct
outcome, but the only allowed tally for an incorrect outcome is that corresponding to the closest possible election
lost by the winner (in this case, a margin of one). We prove that this is a RLA. For such a prior, we show that the
upset probability of the Bayesian audit is also the largest risk.
4. We report on verification of:
(a) our comparison test for the Bayesian audit (1)
(b) the risk limit of the audit in (3).
We draw considerably from the proof approaches in [7].
1.2 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and establishes most of the notation. Section 3
describes the Wald Sequential Test [7], RLAs [1] and Bayesian audits [6]. Our contributions are to be found in sections
4 and 5. Section 4 presents our results on a simple form of the Bayesian audit and a new audit that is both Bayesian
and risk-limiting, the Bayesian RLA. Section 5 presents look-up table forms of the audits and verification of the simple
form of the Bayesian audit and the risk of a Bayesian RLA. Section 6 concludes. Acknowledgements are in section 7
and proofs in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a plurality election with two candidates, N voters and no invalid votes. We assume that N is odd so the
winner is well-defined. It is not hard to extend the results to even N , we use odd N for ease of exposition. We denote
by W the random variable representing the true winner, by w an instance of W , by wa and `a the announced winner
and loser respectively and by x the (true, unknown) number of votes obtained by wa. Thus wa = w if and only if
x > N2 .
A polling audit will estimate whether wa is the true winner. Consider a sample of n votes drawn uniformly at random:
v1, v2, ..., vn, n < N , vi ∈ {wa, `a}. The sample forms the signal or the observation; the corresponding random
variable is denoted Sn ∈ {wa, `a}n, the specific value sn = [v1, v2, ..., vn]. Let ksn denote the number of votes for
wa in the sample; then n− ksn votes are for `a.
The audit computes a binary-valued estimate of the true winner from sn:
wˆn : {wa, `a}n → {wa, `a}
We will refer to the function wˆn as the estimator and wˆn(sn) as the estimate. The audit uses an error measure to
compute the quality of the estimate.
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• If wˆn(sn) = wa and the error measure is acceptable we are done (stop) and declare that the election outcome
was correctly announced.
• If wˆn(sn) = `a and the error measure is acceptable we stop drawing votes and proceed to perform a complete
hand count.
• If the error measure is not acceptable we draw more votes to improve the estimate.
In computing wˆn(sn), we can make two types of errors:
1. Miss: A miss occurs when the announced outcome is incorrect,w 6= wa, but the audit misses this, and wˆn(sn) =
wa. We denote by PM the probability of a miss—given that the announced outcome is incorrect, the probability
that the audit will miss this:
PM = Pr[wˆn(sn) = wa | w 6= wa]
PM is the risk in risk limiting audits. If the audit is viewed as a statistical test, with the null hypothesis being
w = `a, PM is the Type I error.
2. Unnecessary Hand Count: Similarly, if w = wa, but wˆn(sn) = `a, acceptance of the estimate would lead to an
unnecessary hand count. We denote the probability of an unnecessary hand count by PU :
PU = Pr[wˆn(sn) = `a | w = wa]
If the audit is viewed as a statistical test, with the null hypothesis being w = `a, PU is the Type II error.
3 Defining the audit
In this section, we describe three types of audits. We do not attempt to introduce any new ideas, but try to faithfully
represent the existing literature.
1. Wald Sequential Tests
A classical approach is the Wald Sequential Test which limits both PM and PU .
Definition 1: The Wald Sequential Test is the likelihood ratio test [7]:
wˆn =

wa σn >
1−β
α
`a σn <
β
1−α
undetermined (draw more samples) else
(1)
where σn is the likelihood ratio:
σn =
Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa]
Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a]
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and 0 ≤ α, β < 12 .
Proposition 1 [7]: The Wald Sequential Test has PM < α and PU < β, and is a most efficient test achieving
these bounds.
(A most efficient test is one requiring the smallest sample size). An argument supporting Proposition 1 may be
found in [7].
Suppose the draws are independent (with replacement) and ksn of the n votes in the sample are for wa. To
compute the expressions Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa] and Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] required by the test, we need
x, the election’s true vote counts for wa, when w = wa and w = `a respectively. Assume that if wa wins, she
wins with p1N (greater than half) votes, and if she does not (`a wins or the election is a tie), wa obtains p0N
(no more than half) votes, where p1N and p0N are integers, and 12 < p1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 12 . With these
assumptions, the Wald Sequential Test is easily seen to be [7]:
wˆn =

wa
p
ksn
1 (1−p1)n−ksn
p
ksn
0 (1−p0)n−ksn
> 1−βα
`a
pk1 (1−p1)n−ksn
p
ksn
0 (1−p0)n−ksn
< β1−α
undetermined (draw more samples) else
(2)
We will refer to the test defined by (2) as the (α, β, p0, p1) Wald Sequential Test.
Corollary 1: When the only possible values of the true vote count, x, are p1N (wa wins) or p0N (wa loses),
the (α, β, p0, p1) Wald Sequential Test has PM < α and PU < β, and is a most efficient test achieving these
bounds.
Proof: This follows from Proposition 1.
2. Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) [1]
The Wald Sequential Test requires prior knowledge of p1N and p0N , the values of x when wa is the winner and
loser respectively. Unless one performs a full hand count, however, one does not know the true value of x. If p0
and p1 are misestimated, the true upper bounds on the risk and the probability of an unnecessary recount might
not be α and β respectively.
This is particularly important because the audit outcome wˆn(sn) = wa is final (while the outcome wˆn(sn) = `a
is followed by a confirmatory full hand count). At the very least then, we should guarantee an upper bound on
worst case errors when the audit outcome is wˆn(sn) = wa. That is, we would like to bound the risk, independent
of the true value of x.
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) with risk limit α—as described by, for example, Lindeman and Stark [1]—is one for
which the risk is smaller than α for all possible (unknown) true tallies in the election (or—equivalently for the
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two-candidate election—all possible values of x). For convenience when we compare audits, we refer to this
audit as an α-RLA.
There are many functions wˆn that would satisfy the α-RLA criterion, and not all would be desirable. For
example, the constant estimate wˆn(sn) = `a always requires a hand count and is risk-limiting with PM = 0 <
α, ∀α, ∀x. However, PU = 1, and the average number of votes examined by the audit is N ; this is undesirable.
A more efficient example of an α-RLA is the traditional RLA [1] based on Wald sequential tests:
wˆn =

wa
pksn (1−p)n−ksn
( 12 )
n >
1−β
α
`a
pksn (1−p)n−ksn
( 12 )
n <
β
1−α
undetermined (draw more samples) else
(3)
where p depends on the fraction of votes declared for wa and β is the desired upper bound on PU . We denote
this the (α, β, p)-traditional RLA and note that it is identical to the (α, β, 12 , p) Wald Sequential Test. When
β = 0, this is the BRAVO audit [2], which may be denoted the (α, p)-BRAVO audit.
Other RLAs include the CLIP audit [4] which may be expressed as a simple comparison test between the number
of votes for the winner and a pre-computed value that depends on sample size.
3. Bayesian Audits [6]
Bayesian audits, defined by Rivest and Shen [6], assume knowledge of a prior probability distribution on x; we
denote this distribution by fX . In this model, the variable W inherits a prior distribution from fX , because
Pr[w = wa] =
N∑
x=N+12
fX(x)
and
Pr[w = `a] = 1− Pr[w = wa]
Further, given the sample sn, W inherits a posterior distribution, Pr[W | Sn = sn], also known as the a
posteriori probability ofW . The Bayesian audit estimate wˆn(sn) is the candidate that maximizes this probability
(that is, the candidate for whom this value is larger), with the constraint that the probability of estimation error
(the upset probability) is smaller than γ, a pre-determined quantity, 0 < γ < 12 .
The (computational) Bayesian Audit assumes the audit draws votes without replacement and uses knowledge of
fX to simulate the distribution on the unexamined votes, conditional on sn, using Po´lya urns. The estimate wˆn
is the estimate with the largest number of wins in the simulations, provided the fraction of wins is greater than
1− γ.
The drawing of votes without replacement becomes particularly important in a tight election, where low margins
tend to require large samples; an audit with replacement could result in more than N draws, while an audit
without replacement would definitely stop in N draws. Sampling without replacement makes far more efficient
use of the information in a sample, and has since been adopted in the design of traditional RLAs as well, see, for
example, [3].
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The three contributions of Rivest and Shen (sampling without replacement, the Bayesian approach for election
audits and computational Bayesian audits) do not have to be used together: sampling without replacement can
be used for any audit, and Bayesian audits do not have to be computed using Po´lya urn simulations.
We study the general Bayesian audit and do not restrict ourselves to Po´lya urn simulations; this is particu-
larly easy in the two-candidate election. We will refer to the general Bayesian audit as described above as
the (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit. Further, to avoid confusion, the term will always refer to audits without replace-
ment. We do not explore Bayesian audits with replacement. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, we assume that
Pr[w = wa] = Pr[w = `a]
4. Audits with and without replacement
So that we may understand better all the differences between Bayesian audits and other audits, we provide
expressions for both the Wald Sequential Test and the traditional RLA without replacement. We note that the
likelihood ratio is the ratio of the probabilities of drawing a single permutation (denoted by the specific audit
sequence of n draws that sn represents) when the number of votes for wa is p1N and p0N respectively.
That is,
σn =
Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa]
Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] =
hg(ksn ,N,p1N,n)
( nksn)
hg(ksn ,N,p0N,n)
( nksn)
where hg(k,N, x, n) is the hypergeometric distribution: the probability of obtaining k items with the desired
characteristic when n items are drawn from a total of N items of which x have the desired characteristic. In
our case, the items are votes in the election, and those with the desired characteristic are votes for wa. Thus
hg(ksn , N, x, n) is the probability of drawing ksn votes for wa in a sample of size n drawn from the N votes
cast in the election, of which x is the true number of votes for wa. Dividing this value by
(
n
ksn
)
gives us the
probability of drawing a particular sequence of n votes of which ksn are forwa. (The term
(
n
ksn
)
will be common
to the numerator and denominator in the likelihood ration and will cancel out).
The (α, β, p0, p1) Wald Sequential Test without replacement is:
wˆn =

wa
hg(ksn ,N,p1N,n)
hg(ksn ,N,p0N,n)
> 1−βα
`a
hg(ksn ,N,p1N,n)
hg(ksn ,N,p0N,n)
< β1−α
undetermined (draw more samples) else
(4)
The reader may compare the above to (1) and (2).
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Similarly, the (α, β, p)-traditional RLA without replacement is:
wˆn =

wa
hg(ksn ,N,pN,n)
hg(ksn ,N,
N
2 ,n)
> 1−βα
`a
hg(ksn ,N,pN,n)
hg(ksn ,N,
N
2 ,n)
< β1−α
undetermined (draw more samples) else
(5)
where p is the fraction of votes declared for wa. The reader may compare the above to (3). Note that, for β = 0,
this is the (α, p)-BRAVO audit without replacement.
4 Relationships Among the Audits
In this section we demonstrate relationships among the different types of audits described in the previous section.
Some of the material presented is obvious, some might have been shown elsewhere. But we are not aware of this
material appearing together elsewhere in similar form, and we believe Theorems 1 and 2, at the very least, are original.
4.1 A general expression for the Bayesian audit without replacement
In this section we derive a general expression for the Bayesian audit.
Theorem 1: The (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit is of the form:
wˆn =

wa τn >
1−γ
γ
`a τn <
γ
1−γ
undetermined (draw more samples) else
(6)
where τn is the ratio:
τn =
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] = σn ×
Pr[w = wa]
Pr[w = `a]
or
τn =
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)
(7)
Proof: See the appendix for the proof. (Note that, for the summations in (7), it is x that varies, while, for the hy-
pergeometric distribution, it is k that varies. A normalizing factor in both the numerator and denominator—from the
application of Bayes’ theorem—accounts for this, and cancels out.)
Readers may compare the expression of Theorem 1 with expression (5).
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4.2 The Wald Sequential Test and the Bayesian Audit
Some Wald Sequential Tests are instances of a Bayesian audit. In this section, we make this relationship precise. Here,
δx,a denotes the (discrete) Kronecker delta function which takes on the value 1 for x = a and is zero otherwise.
Corollary 2: The (γ, γ, p0, p1) Wald Sequential Test without replacement is the (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit for
fX =
1
2
δx,p0N +
1
2
δx,p1N
Proof: The result follows trivially from (4), (6) and (7).
4.3 The traditional RLA as a Bayesian Audit
When the only possible values for x are p0Nor p1N , the value α is the risk of the (α, β, p0, p1) Wald Sequential Test.
The risk of the test could be larger if the true value of x is not one of these two. On the other hand, whatever the true
value of x, the risk of the (α, β, 12 , p1) Wald Sequential Test will not be larger than α; that is, the (α, β,
1
2 , p1) Wald
Sequential Test is an α-RLA. While we have not seen this result proven in the literature, it is well-known, and related
to Theorem 2, which we prove later.
The traditional RLA (3) is a special case of the (α, β, p0, p1) Wald Sequential Test, with p0 = 12 and p1 chosen ac-
cording to various considerations. From Corollary 2, when α = β the traditional RLA is also a Bayesian audit with
γ = α = β.
Corollary 3: The (γ, γ, p)-traditional RLA without replacement is the (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit for
fX =
1
2
δx,N2
+
1
2
δx,pN
Proof: The result follows trivially from Corollary 2 and the fact that the (γ, γ, p)-traditional RLA is the (γ, γ, 12 , p)-
Wald Sequential Test.
Note that the (α, p)-BRAVO audit may not be represented as a special case of the above because the Bayesian audit
as defined by Rivest and Shen requires α = β. However, a more general definition of the Bayesian audit, where the
probability of erring when the outcome is correct is zero and not equal to the probability of erring when the outcome
is wrong, would correspond to the BRAVO audit for fX as above.
4.4 A General RLA
In this section, we see that we can define a general form of the RLA using the Bayesian model. To do so, we first
examine in more detail the risk of an audit.
Risk-Limiting Bayesian Polling Audits for Two Candidate Elections 10
4.4.1 The Risk of any Audit
We first establish additional notation in order to represent the risk. Given any audit, consider the audit sample se-
quences sn for which the audit stops with wˆn(sn) = wa. Denote this set of sample sequences by Λ. Note that n is
not fixed because the number of samples drawn is not fixed, thus Λ contains sequences of different lengths. Similarly,
denote by Λ the set of sample sequences for which the audit ends with wˆn(sn) = `a.
Lemma 1: The (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit has
Pr[wˆn(sn) = wa | w 6= wa] = PM =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = `a]
< γ
Pr[wˆn(sn) = `a | w = wa] = PU =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = wa]
< γ
Proof: See the Appendix for the proof.
Each audit we have covered (whether Bayesian, traditional risk-limiting or Wald Sequential) assumes a prior (the
values of p0 and p1 for the Wald Sequential Test, p for the traditional RLA and fX for the Bayesian audit). The
choice of prior results in the sets Λ and Λ of sample sequences sn for which the audit stops—with wˆn(sn) = wa or
wˆn(sn) = `a, respectively. A different prior—for the same audit—would result in different sets Λ and Λ, which are
independent of the particular election itself, or the true tally. These sets define the audit. The true risk of an audit is a
function of the set Λ and the true tally when `a wins (the unknown value of x). In order to avoid confusion, we will
not denote the true risk by PM , which has so far referred to an ex ante definition of the risk (one that does not take the
true tally into consideration, but is derived using the assumed prior).
The true risk of the audit is the probability of drawing any of the sample sequences in Λ, when the number of votes
for wa is x for some unknown x < N2 . Denoting true risk, or ex poste risk, by PT , we have:
PT (Λ, x) =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[Sn = sn | x;w = `a] =
∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N, x, n)(
n
ksn
) (8)
See Appendix for details.
4.4.2 The Risk-Limiting Bayesian Audit
We now describe a way to choose a set of points Λ such that PT (Λ, x) < α ∀ x. That is, we describe an approach to
obtaining an α-RLA. For this purpose we first define the particular type of probability distribution on x.
Given a prior fX of the vote count for electionE, define the risk-maximizing distribution corresponding to fX (denoted
f∗X ) as follows.
f∗X =

fX(x) x ≥ N+12
1
2 x =
N−1
2
0 else
(9)
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Note that f∗X is a valid distribution for the vote count of an election.
Theorem 2: The (α, f∗X)-Bayesian Audit is an α-RLA with PU < α for election E with prior fX .
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 4: The (α, α, 12 , p)-Wald Sequential Test, which is also the (α, α, p)-traditional RLA, is an α-RLA.
Proof: Follows from Corollary 2 and Theorem 2.
A more general version of Corollary 4, for the (α, β, p)-traditional RLA is generally known to be true, and can be
proven as above but we are not aware of a proof in the literature on election audits.
5 Computing RLAs and Bayesian Audits
We defined a general Bayesian RLA in the previous section. The prior f∗X is not a natural fit to computing using Po´lya
urns, however. In this section we describe how the Bayesian RLA may be pre-computed. Pre-computation improves
the computational efficiency of a Bayesian audit, no longer constraining us to the use of Po´lya urn simulations. As a
consequence, we are also not restricted to beta distributions for the prior. We begin with the pre-computation of the
traditional RLA, which follows from a classical result by Wald [7].
5.1 Audits and pre-computed look-up tables
We observe that the Wald, traditional RLAs and Bayesian audits may be defined in the form:
wˆn(sn) =

wa ksn ≥ k+
`a ksn ≤ k−
undetermined else
(draw more samples)
(10)
where k+ and k− are determined by the specific audit.
For example, for the traditional RLA (3), p
ksn (1−p)n−ksn
( 12 )
n is monotone increasing with ksn because p > 1 − p, and
hence
pk
∗
(1− p)n−k∗
( 12 )
n
>
1− β
α
⇒ p
ksn (1− p)n−ksn
( 12 )
n
>
1− β
α
∀ksn ≥ k∗
Similarly,
pk
∗
(1− p)n−k∗
( 12 )
n
<
β
1− α ⇒
pksn (1− p)n−ksn
( 12 )
n
<
β
1− α ∀ksn ≤ k
∗
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Let k+ be the smallest integer k such that
pk(1− p)n−k
( 12 )
n
>
1− β
α
and k− the largest integer k such that:
pk(1− p)n−k
( 12 )
n
<
β
1− α
and hence:
k+ = ceiling(
log( 1−βα )
log( p1−p )
+ n
log(
1
2
1−p )
log( p1−p )
) (11)
and
k− = floor(
log( β1−α )
log( p1−p )
+ n
log(
1
2
1−p )
log( p1−p )
) (12)
For the traditional RLA without replacement, simple algebra demonstrates that hg(k,N,p1N,n)
hg(k,N,N2 ,n)
is monotone increasing
with k and k+ is the smallest integer k such that
hg(k,N, p1N,n)
hg(k,N, N2 , n)
>
1− β
α
and k− the largest integer k such that:
hg(k,N, p1N,n)
hg(k,N, N2 , n)
<
β
1− α
For the Bayesian audit (6) too, one may show, as one may expect, that τn is monotone increasing with k. k+ is the
smallest integer k such that ∑N
x=N+12
hg(k, n, x,N)fX(x)∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(k, n, x,N)fX(x)
>
1− γ
γ
and k− the largest integer k such that:∑N
x=N+12
hg(k, n, x,N)fX(x)∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(k, n, x,N)fX(x)
<
γ
1− γ
5.2 Experimental Verification
We performed experiments to: (a) generate lookup tables using the expressions we derived for the general Bayesian
audit, as described in Theorem 1 and section 5.1; (b) verify the lookup tables; (c) generate lookup tables for the
Bayesian RLA we propose and verify that the maximum risk is as expected and (d) compare the number of samples
required to stop the various audits.
5.2.1 Generation of Lookup Tables for the Bayesian Audit
We used the derived expressions for the Bayesian audit to form a look-up table for values of k+ given values of n
(see Table 1), assuming the beta distribution prior with pseudo-counts of 0.5 for each candidate (fX(x) is proportional
to x−
1
2 (1 − x)− 12 ), an election with N = 100, 000 votes, and an escalating audit with sample sizes escalating by a
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factor of 2—beginning at 200 and ending at 51,200. We generated values of k+ for each of the nine values of n and
γ = 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.002, 0.001, see Table 1.
We used the computed values of k+ to simulate 1,000 audits of a tied election with N votes, and computed the
fractional number of times the audit stopped (declaring the outcome correct); this is an estimate of the maximum risk
of the audit over all possible values of the tally. We observe that the maximum risk is many times the upset probability.
In unpublished simulations performed independently by us, Ottoboni and Rivest, the maximum risk is even larger for
finer audit samples.
Upset Max. Audit sample size, n
Prob. γ Risk 200 400 800 1,600 3,200 6,400 12,800 25,600 51,200
0.1 0.416 110 213 419 826 1,636 3,250 6,468 12,889 25,702
0.05 0.236 112 217 424 833 1,646 3,264 6,487 12,914 25,731
0.02 0.138 115 221 429 841 1,658 3,280 6,509 12,942 25,763
0.01 0.061 117 224 433 847 1,665 3,291 6,523 12,961 25,785
0.005 0.028 119 226 437 852 1,672 3,300 6,537 12,978 25,804
0.002 0.011 121 229 441 858 1,681 3,312 6,553 12,999 25,828
0.001 0.007 122 231 444 862 1,686 3,320 6,564 13,014 25,845
Table 1: Values of k+ computed for the Bayesian audit with N = 100, 000 and fX proportional to x−
1
2 (1− x)− 12
5.2.2 Verification of the Bayesian Audit Expression
To verify our results, we compared the maximum risk estimates obtain using the lookup tables to those computed using
Rivest’s public software library [5] with 10,000 inner trials for the Bayesian simulations (10,000 simulations given an
audit sample, to estimate the Bayesian posterior and the upset probability) and 10,000 outer trials (10,000 instances of
the audit) on a tied election with N = 100, 000. We had access to the following data2:
1. The final values of k—the number of votes for wa in the sample—and n—the size of the sample—for each of
10,000 instances of the Bayesian audit, for γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.005.
2. The fractional number of times the audit stopped (maximum risk) over 10,000 instances, for γ = 0.1, 0.05, 0.02,
0.01, 0.005, 0.002, 0.001.
We know that the final values of k ((1) above) are values for which the Bayesian audit computed with Po´lya urn
simulations stopped. We compare these values of k with the corresponding values of k+ computed by us to determine
if the audit using the look-up table would also have stopped. We found that the error rate between the two audits was
0.0855 for γ = 0.1 and 0.0118 for γ = 0.005, which indicates considerable general agreement.
In both cases most of the errors occur at the sample size of 51, 200, when the Bayesian audit goes to a full hand
count, while our expression predicts that it should stop. This is because the Bayesian audit, based on probabilistic
simulations, may take an audit with k1 votes for the winner to a full hand count, and also stop the audit for a sample
2Thanks to Ronald L. Rivest for providing the results of these simulations that he had carried out for a different purpose.
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with k2 votes for the winner, when k2 < k1. We expect that this variance is a function of the number of inner trials.
On the other hand, the behaviour of the look-up table audit is a deterministic and monotonic function of the value of
k, and if a sample with k1 votes goes to a full hand count, so would any sample with k2 votes, for all k2 < k1.
We compared (2) above to our estimates of the risk reported in Table 1. Our results were similar (see Table 2), and
differences are likely attributable to the difference in the number of simulations (10,000 and 1,000) and in the finiteness
of the number of simulations; that is, the values in both cases are simply estimates.
Upset Probability γ Risk Limit of Bayesian Audit Risk Limit Estimated using Lookup Table
0.1 0.4168 0.416
0.05 0.2531 0.236
0.02 0.1244 0.138
0.01 0.0634 0.061
0.005 0.0372 0.028
0.002 0.0154 0.011
0.001 0.0083 0.007
Table 2: Risk limit estimates for the seven-tier Bayesian audit forN = 100, 000 and fX proportional to x−
1
2 (1−x)− 12
5.2.3 Example Bayesian Risk Limiting Audits
We computed two Bayesian RLAs.
1. N = 100, 000, risk measures of 0.1 and 0.005
We computed Bayesian RLAs for N = 100, 000, risk measures of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.005, and an escalating audit
with sample sizes escalating by a factor of 2—beginning at 200 and ending at 51,200, and a prior that is uniform
on tallies favoring the winner and concentrated on a margin of one for tallies favoring the loser. In Table 3, we
compare the values k+ for the two types of Bayesian audits, standard and RLA. Because the range in the values
Bayesian Bayesian Audit sample size, n
error γ Audit Type 200 400 800 1,600 3,200 6,400 12,800 25,600 51,200
0.1 Standard 110 213 419 826 1,636 3,250 6,468 12,889 25,702
RLA 120 230 443 863 1,691 3,331 6,585 13,049 25,897
0.05 Standard 112 217 424 833 1,646 3,264 6,487 12,914 25,731
RLA 122 232 447 868 1,698 3,339 6,596 13,063 25,913
0.005 Standard 119 226 437 852 1,672 3,300 6,537 12,978 25,804
RLA 127 239 456 880 1,715 3,363 6,627 13,103 25,957
Table 3: Values of k+ computed for the Bayesian RLA with N = 100, 000 and constant fX , and compared to the
Bayesian audit with the same parameters
of k+ is very large, the differences between the values of k+ for the two types of audits are not visible in a
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figure. Instead, Figure 1 contains plots of the difference between k+ for the Bayesian RLA and the standard
Bayesian audit.
Figure 1: The minimum number of winner votes for the Bayesian RLA (k+) less those for the standard Bayesian audit
as a function of sample size.
2. N = 100, risk measure 0.001.
We computed values of k+ for N = 100, two candidates and risk measure 0.001 and audit sample sizes from
9-78 and compared the following audits:
(a) Traditional RLA with replacement, p = 0.75. That is, if the declared winner has won the election, we
assume it is with a fractional vote count of 0.75.
(b) Traditional RLA without replacement, p = 0.75.
(c) Bayesian RLA corresponding to the uniform distribution. That is, the prior is uniform over all winning
tallies, and the only possibility for w 6= wa is a fractional vote of 0.5 (a tie), with probability 0.5. The
fractional vote of 0.75 in the traditional RLAs was chosen because the center of mass of the Bayesian prior
when w = wa is a fractional vote of 0.75.
(d) The Bayesian audit corresponding to the uniform distribution.
Figure 2 plots the values of k+ for samples sizes from 9 through 75. We observe that the audits as listed
above are in increasing order of leniency. In particular, we note that the Bayesian RLA requires fewer votes
for the winner than does the traditional RLA without replacement, which is interesting. We also notice that the
traditional RLA with replacement requires the largest number of votes for the winner, and the Bayesian audit the
smallest. This is as expected. Note that traditional RLAs are denoted BRAVO-like RLAs in the figure.
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Figure 2: Minimum number of winner votes as a function of sample size
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have defined a risk-limiting Bayesian polling audit for two-candidate elections and demonstrated that any Bayesian
polling audit for two-candidate elections is a simple comparison test between the number of votes for the announced
winner in a sample and a pre-computed value for that sample size. Open questions include the application of this model
to comparison audits and audits for more complex elections. Also open are the problems of an efficient algorithm to
obtain the pre-computed values and the use of this approach in optimizing various election-related criteria.
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8 Appendix
Theorem 1: The (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit is of the form:
wˆn =

wa τn >
1−γ
γ
`a τn <
γ
1−γ
undetermined (draw more samples) else
where τn is the ratio:
τn =
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] = σn ×
Pr[w = wa]
Pr[w = `a]
or
τn =
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)
Further, PM , PU < γ, and:
PM =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = `a]
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PU =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = wa]
Proof: The audit stops when the estimation error is smaller than γ; because this is a binary election, it stops with
wˆn(sn) = wa when:
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] < γ
and, hence, when:
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn] > 1− γ
Thus wˆn(sn) = wa when:
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] >
1− γ
γ
Similarly, wˆn(sn) = `a when:
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] <
γ
1− γ
Hence the Bayesian Audit is of the form:
wˆn =

wa τn >
1−γ
γ
`a τn <
γ
1−γ
undetermined (draw more samples) else
where τn is the ratio:
τn =
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] =
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]× Pr[Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn]× Pr[Sn = sn] =
Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa]× Pr[w = wa]
Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a]× Pr[w = `a]
= σn × Pr[w = wa]
Pr[w = `a]
Continuing, we observe:
τn =
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn] =
Pr[w = wa | Sn = sn]× Pr[Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn]× Pr[Sn = sn] =
Pr[w = wa;Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a;Sn = sn]
Which is, further:
Pr[w = wa;Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a;Sn = sn]
=
∑N
x=N+12
Pr[X = x;Sn = sn]∑N−1
2
x=0 Pr[X = x;Sn = sn]
=
∑N
x=N+12
Pr[Sn = sn | X = x]Pr[X = x]∑N−1
2
x=0 Pr[Sn = sn | X = x]Pr[X = x]
=
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn ,N,x,n)fX(x)
( nksn)∑N−1
2
x=0
hg(ksn ,N,x,n)fX(x)
( nksn)
=
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , N, x, n)fX(x)∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , N, x, n)fX(x)
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Lemma 1: The (γ, fX)-Bayesian audit has
PM =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = `a]
< γ
PU =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = wa]
< γ
Proof: We now show that PM , PU < γ, using an approach very similar to the proof of Proposition 1 by Wald. For
sn ∈ Λ,
Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] = Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn]× Pr[Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a]
=
Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn]× (Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a]Pr[w = `a] + Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa]Pr[w = wa])
Pr[w = `a]
= Pr[w = `a | Sn = sn]× (Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] + Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa])
< γ(Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] + Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa])
Hence,
PM =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] < γPM + γ
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[Sn = sn | w = wa] = γPM + γ(1− PU )
Similarly,
PU < γPU + γ(1− PM )
This gives us PM + PU < 2γ, and hence at least one of PM and PU is smaller than γ; also each is smaller than 2γ.
Further,
PU
1− PM <
γ
1− γ
and
PM
1− PU <
γ
1− γ
For small γ, both PU and PM are small and 1−PM , 1−PU , 1−γ,≈ 1. Hence PM < γ and PU < γ is approximately
true.
Finally:
PM =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[Sn = sn | w = `a] =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[w = `a;Sn = sn]
Pr[w = `a]
=
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N−1
2
x=0 hg(ksn , N, x, n)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = `a]
PU =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[w = wa;Sn = sn]
Pr[w = wa]
=
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , N, x, n)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = wa]
Details for Equation (8):
PT (Λ, x) =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[Sn = sn | x;w = `a] =
∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N, x, n)(
n
ksn
)
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Proof: Looking at all sequences of length N ,
PT (Λ, x) =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑
cN−n∈{wa,`a}N−n
Pr[(sn || cN−n) | x;w = `a] =
∑
sn∈Λ
Pr[Sn = sn | x;w = `a]
=
∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N, x, n)(
n
ksn
)
Theorem 2: The (α, f∗X)-Bayesian Audit is an α-RLA with PU < α for election E with prior fX .
Proof: By Theorem 1, for the (α, f∗X)-Bayesian Audit
PM =
∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N,
N−1
2 , n)× f∗X(N−12 )(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = `a]
=
∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N,
N−1
2 , n)(
n
ksn
) < α
and
PU =
∑
sn∈Λ
∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , n, x,N)fX(x)(
n
ksn
)
Pr[w = wa]
< α
Further, using simple algebra, one can show that, for fixed N , n and k ∈ (n2 , n], hg(k,N, x, n) is a monotone
increasing function of x for x ∈ [0, N−12 ]. That is,
k >
n
2
⇒ hg(k,N, x, n) ≤ hg(k,N, N − 1
2
, n) ∀x ∈ [0, N − 1
2
]
Additionally, for sn ∈ Λ we have: ∑N
x=N+12
hg(ksn , N, x, n)f
∗
X(x)
hg(ksn , N,
N−1
2 , n)f
∗
X(
N−1
2 )
>
1− γ
γ
> 1
and, again using simple algebra, one can show that, for fixed N , n and k ∈ [0, n2 ], hg(k,N, x, n) is a monotone
decreasing function of x for x ∈ [N−12 , N ]. That is,
k ≤ n
2
⇒ hg(k,N, x, n) ≤ hg(k,N, N − 1
2
, n) ∀x ∈ [N − 1
2
, N ]
Thus, for sn ∈ Λ,
ksn ≤
n
2
⇒ hg(sn, N, x, n) ≤ hg(sn, N, N − 1
2
, n) ∀x ∈ [N − 1
2
, N ]
and:
N∑
x=N+12
hg(ksn , N, x, n)f
∗
X(x) ≤ hg(sn, N,
N − 1
2
, n)f∗X(
N − 1
2
)
Because this contradicts the requirement for sn ∈ Λ, ksn ≥ n2 .
For an election with true tally x and the (α, f∗X)-Bayesian Audit,
PT (Λ, x) =
∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N, x, n)(
n
ksn
) ≤ ∑
sn∈Λ
hg(ksn , N,
N−1
2 , n)(
n
ksn
) = PM < α ∀x ∈ [0, N − 1
2
]
and the (α, f∗X)-Bayesian Audit is an α-RLA with PU < α.
